Laws in Massachusetts and California requiring that sex-segregated facilities be open to both sexes will undermine equal protection for women.
California has followed Massachusetts into
uncharted territory by requiring California schools to make
sex-segregated facilities and activities available to members of both sexes.
Those who advocated this move might not like all of the implications of what
they have accomplished. Among the many likely casualties of these laws will be
the logic of the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, which protects
females from suspect classifications in law.
Earlier this
year, the Massachusetts Department of Education (MDOE) issued regulatory guidance for
Massachusetts schools concerning a recent state statute that
prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender identity. MDOE interprets the
statute to give students a right to use the bathroom, locker room, and changing
facilities that correspond to the gender with which those students identify,
regardless of their biological sex.
The MDOE directive notes that some
students might be uncomfortable disrobing with a member of the opposite sex,
but insists, "This discomfort is not a reason to deny access to the
transgender student." The directive also encourages school administrators
to discipline students who object to sharing a bathroom with a member of the
opposite sex.
At the time,
Andrew Beckwith and I argued that this development is
part of a trend: judges and lawmakers are eliminating sexual
distinctions from Massachusetts law, and driving out of public life anyone who perceives
inherent differences between male and female. But the MDOE directive
presupposes that many sex-segregated activities will persist; indeed, they will
persist because at least some transgendered students want them to
persist. A biological boy who identifies as a girl does so in part by using the
girls' bathroom.
MDOE did what the state legislature
declined to do. The legislature had earlier enacted a statute prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of "gender identity," but pro-family
forces in the Commonwealth defeated a provision in the original bill that would
have given boys a right to use girls' bathrooms and vice versa. Yet MDOE
proceeded as if the provision had been enacted.
In this respect,
and in this respect alone, the law recently enacted in California represents an
improvement over the legal change in Massachusetts--at least it was promulgated
democratically. The legislature passed, and the California governor signed, a statute giving students the
right to choose which gender they will be in sex-segregated
activities.
It should go without saying that to
give boys a legal right to disregard their Y chromosomes when selecting a place
to undress is to invite abuse. It should go without saying that this law is a
menace to school-age girls and their families. It should go without saying that
a child who feels alienated from his or her own sex ought to be encouraged and
affirmed for who he or she is, rather than given a legal right to pretend to be
something he or she is not. But alas, such evident truths no longer go without
saying.
However, advocates for these laws
may have attained more than they intended. These laws undermine a foundational
premise of the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, namely that sex
is an immutable characteristic. If the bathroom laws in Massachusetts and
California are grounded in truths about human nature and sexuality, then that
premise is either false or irrelevant, and it is not clear on what basis the
Supreme Court could continue to employ heightened scrutiny when reviewing laws
that discriminate between men and women.
For four decades, the Supreme Court
has reviewed laws that discriminate between men and women with extra attention.
In Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) it struck down a statute that
treated husbands of female military personnel less favorably than wives of male
personnel for the purpose of distributing allowances and benefits. The Court
declared sex to be a suspect classification. It reasoned that
since
sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined
solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon
the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility.
Therefore, the Court found
classifications based on sex to be "inherently suspect," and resolved
to review them with heightened judicial scrutiny.
When someone is discriminated
against because of immutable traits that do not affect that person's suitability
for the opportunity denied to him or her, the discrimination appears more
likely than not to be unjust. The classic example of an immutable
characteristic remains one's race, and the best example of unjust
discrimination remains a law requiring or allowing racial segregation.
Of course, one's sex does make one
more or less suitable for certain opportunities--e.g., being a mother--but not
for others--e.g., practicing law. Where to draw the line between those sets of
opportunities is sometimes a controversial question. But the immutability of
sex has long been a given. It explains why the law reasonably discriminates in
favor of women when it identifies the mothers of children. It also explains why
a law prohibiting women from practicing law would be unjust. Under such a law,
a woman would be disqualified for a reason that she cannot control and that
does not render her unsuitable for the opportunity.
The immutability of sex has long
been a foundation stone of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence. In the
landmark case United States v. Virginia, the Court affirmed that
physical differences between men and women are "enduring"; that
"a community made up exclusively of one sex is different from a community
composed of both"; and that inherent differences between men and women are
"cause for celebration." But, the Court stated, those differences are
not reasonable grounds for segregating the sexes arbitrarily.
Now education regulators in
Massachusetts and lawmakers in California have declared sex or gender to be
mutable. It is a characteristic to be denied, or even escaped from, if
authentic self-definition requires it.
If gender is what counts, and if
gender is mutable, then on what ground should references to sex and genetics
not be eradicated from the law? And if that is the lesson to be learned from
Massachusetts and California then why should the Equal Protection Clause be
exempted from the leveling to which all other laws must yield? The Court treats
sex-based classifications with higher scrutiny than classifications based on
age, for example, in part because it views women as beings who are born with
particular traits and genetic compositions that distinguish them from men and
do not change with time.
Moreover, the remedial requirements
of the Massachusetts and California laws might come into conflict with the
requirements of equal protection. Consider again United States v. Virginia.
In that case, the Court struck down on equal protection grounds the male-only
admission policy of the Virginia Military Institute. The Court required VMI to
demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the policy.
VMI explained that its rigorous, "adversative method" of educating
cadets would need to be made less rigorous to accommodate women. The Court
conceded that VMI's program of education would need to be altered, but insisted
that because some women would be qualified for the program, this justification
was not "exceedingly persuasive."
On this logic, the remedy for
unlawful sex discrimination is integration of the sexes for those activities to
which men and women are equally suited and segregation of the sexes for those
activities in which their differences are important. Women are born as women,
and remain women throughout their lives. To treat them justly is to integrate
them into the activities of men for which at least some of them can be well
suited, while establishing or preserving accommodations for their natural
differences.
By contrast, the gender-identity
self-authorship that Massachusetts and California now must promote requires at
least some segregation of the sexes for those activities to which some men and
some women might be equally suited, such as athletic competition. If a member
of the male sex identifies as a member of the female gender, and if the
community owes to that person opportunities to express himself as a female,
then he must have female-specific activities in which to participate. The mutability
of gender, on this line of thinking, is a reason to keep men and women separate
so that those who would change their gender identity can have opportunities to
do so.
Meanwhile, the mutability of gender
is also a reason to allow at least some biological boys the right to disrobe
with biological girls. If a female is one who identifies as a member of the
female gender, regardless of sex, then the biological boy who identifies as
female really is a female, and belongs in the girls' room. Whatever burdens
this arrangement imposes upon the biological girls in the girls' room are not
sufficient reasons to shield them from this newly-recognized reality. And so,
on this line of thinking, girls should bear the burdens of sharing
bathrooms and locker rooms with some biological boys.
What became of the "the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility," which the Frontiero Court
vindicated? What special responsibilities do school-age girls have to share
bathrooms and locker rooms with boys who identify themselves as girls, or of
competing with boys for positions on girls' sports teams? This development
seems to flip the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence on its head.
Adam MacLeod is
an associate professor at Faulkner University's Thomas Goode Jones School of
Law.
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